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Philosophy and the Politics of Unreason 
Paul W. Kahn† 
Stephen Holmes has presented a lecture full of good ideas and genuine 
common sense.1 If I were in a position to hire him as deputy secretary of state 
for policy and planning, I would. Over the past few years, he has produced a 
number of pieces that identify the errors and dangers in arguments made by the 
Bush administration and its supporters.2 He writes in praise of the rule of law, 
drawing our attention to the institutional wisdom embodied in our traditions of 
constitutional governance. Since these arguments all seem so reasonable, I 
always come back to the question: why does our government continue to act in 
ways that are so unreasonable? The answer, I will argue, is because reason is 
not the only measure of political action.3 
Although Holmes, for the most part, avoids overt partisan critique, critics 
have received his essays in just that manner. Regardless of how objectively 
pragmatic any commentator tries to be, the issues at hand are inevitably 
understood as political. There is no neutral position from which one can offer 
an analysis of the facts of the matter, because the language of reason is the 
language of political critique in American life.4 We, meaning the political 
opposition, think that everything is clear. Because of the allure of reason, we 
come away feeling that were we in office we would do better. A longer view, 
however, suggests that we might not. 
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1. This article is a response to Stephen Holmes, Keynote Address at the 11th Annual 
Thomas M. Jorde Symposium: In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on 
Terror (Nov. 5, 2007), in 97 Calif. L. Rev. 301 (2009) [hereinafter Holmes, In Case of 
Emergency]. 
2. Many of these essays are collected in Stephen Holmes, The Matador’s Cape: 
America’s Reckless Response to Terror (2007). 
3. Holmes himself wrote one of the more interesting analyses of the role of the 
unreasonable in the response to terror. See Stephen Holmes, Is Defiance of Law Proof of Success? 
Magical Thinking in the War on Terror, in The Torture Debate in America 118 (Karen J. 
Greenberg ed., 2006). 
4. See Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal 
Scholarship 7-18 (1999) [hereinafter Kahn, Cultural Study]. 
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The mistakes of the Bush administration are similar to the mistakes of the 
Johnson administration in Vietnam. They seem to be the characteristic mistakes 
of nations fighting wars in which tactics of informal warfare appear; perhaps 
they are the characteristic mistakes of nations fighting any wars. Consider the 
British in Northern Ireland, the French in Algeria, or the Israelis in the Middle 
East: torture and lawlessness seem to follow terror. We have seen similar 
mistakes made by the Russians in Chechnya and by the various authoritarian 
regimes in Latin America over the last fifty years. The issues here do not fall 
out on a line that divides democratic from authoritarian regimes, any more than 
they fall out on the partisan divide of American politics. In truth, therefore, we 
do not have much reason to be confident that we would do better. Accordingly, 
the questions I want to address are, first, whether the type of pragmatic analysis 
of the administration’s failings that Holmes offers gets to the heart of the 
matter, and, second, what an alternative analysis might look like. 
I 
WHAT DO PHILOSOPHERS ADD? 
Let me be clear from the very beginning that my criticism of “In Case of 
Emergency” is by no means meant as a defense of the Bush administration’s 
policies or actions. I agree with virtually everything that Holmes has to say as 
to the failure and foolishness of those policies. That agreement fuels my 
political opposition to the administration; it does not put me in a nonpolitical 
space of critique. More importantly, my political opposition is not a function of 
any insights I gather from my pursuit of a philosophical inquiry into law and 
politics. Holmes and I are both philosophers by training. Nevertheless, the issue 
that separates us is not about political choices, but about what philosophy can 
contribute to our understanding of our political lives. At stake in our different 
approaches, then, is not a set of political practices, but differing visions of the 
nature of philosophy. 
When philosophers argue, as Holmes does, for a reasonable public 
policy—one that considers long-term consequences, the likely sources of 
mistakes, and the benefits of public transparency—philosophy becomes just 
another form of the modern pursuit of reason. Reasonable rules for political 
practice are the ordinary domain of lawyers, at least since the New Deal made 
lawyers central to the administration of the modern state. Indeed, part of the 
“scandal” of the Bush administration, from the legal point of view, has been its 
displacement of ordinary career lawyers from participation in policy decisions.5 
Not surprisingly, that displacement resulted in a loss of institutional knowledge, 
leading to multiple policy failures. 
 
5. See Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of 
American Values 213-15 (2008) (describing marginalization of traditional government and 
military lawyers). 
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Holmes’s lecture is, above all, a call for a return to the rule of law in its 
most ordinary, bureaucratic, and administrative sense. Philosophers can be as 
skilled at making such arguments as lawyers. The philosopher as lawyer used 
to be called a “sophist.”6 While there is nothing wrong with the legal, sophistic 
perspective—indeed, it is necessary—that form of argument gives up the 
uniqueness of a philosophical analysis. Philosophy need not aim higher, but it 
should aim deeper. We already have enough lawyers. 
Holmes’s entire lecture is a plea for reasonableness. But philosophy, in 
my mind, is not about reasonableness, but about truth. To identify truth and 
reasonableness is itself a polemical position. It is what the political opposition 
will always claim in the modern liberal state: reason supports our politics 
against theirs.7 Partisan interests are always cast as contrary to reason, while the 
common good is always described as that to which all reasonable people would 
agree. Modern, liberal political theory builds models of pure practical reason, 
as in Rawls’s original position or Habermas’s ideal speech conditions.8 
Philosophically, we would do better by beginning from the premise that there is 
little that is reasonable about the truth of our political condition. In short, the 
divide between Holmes and myself is simultaneously insubstantial—at the 
level of policy—and deep. In exploring this divide, I hope to say something 
about the nature of the political, but nothing at all about what the administration 
should do. In practical terms, it should follow the reasonable rules that Holmes 
articulates. 
II 
HOW RATIONAL ARE WE? 
The fundamental assumption behind Holmes’s analysis appears 
immediately in the example of his daughter, Alexa, in the hospital.9 The 
example works on the assumption that the ends of the state and the hospital are 
the same: to replace danger with security. For Holmes, saving his daughter’s 
life is paradigmatic not just of rule-governed behavior, but of the appropriate 
end for the state. The story is straight out of liberal political theory. A child has 
suffered an accident. Accidents happen in the state of nature. Without rules, all 
of life would be a succession of accidents, for there could be no rational 
planning. The state tames nature and saves lives by enacting and following 
rules. In the hospital, these rules are protocols of treatment; in the state, these 
rules are laws. Rules represent the presence of reason; adherence to the rules 
 
6. See, e.g., Plato, Gorgias 452E-457c (Robin Waterfield trans., 1992) (describing the 
sophist Gorgias as engaging in the lawyerly skills of rhetorical persuasion). 
7. This is reflected in a number of recent books by the liberal opposition. See, e.g., Al 
Gore, The Assault on Reason (2007); Robert B. Reich, Reason: Why Liberals Will Win 
the Battle for America (2004). 
8. See generally Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1987); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999). 
9. See Holmes, In Case of Emergency, supra note 1, at 301-02. 
KAHN.15.POSTAUTHOR 4/30/2009  11:40:20 PM 
396 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:393 
represents the commitment to reason over nature. Holmes wants us to see that 
deviation from the rules is irrational, since the consequence will likely be a 
return to a state of nature. Hospital and state are two loci of a common project: 
to advance individual well-being. Thus, both hospital and state pursue a 
modern project of eliminating pain through the application of reason.10 
Our paths divide at just this point, for I do not assume that the end of the 
state is to advance individual well-being. I do not say that the state is 
indifferent to well-being, but that this is neither the sole, nor the most 
important, end for the state.11 If we were to look, without any theoretical 
presuppositions, at the histories of modern nation-states—including our own—I 
do not think we could say that the state is pursuing the same end as the hospital. 
Regardless of its position on health care, the state is also an institution willing 
to deploy violence, death, and destruction. Our national narrative is organized 
around killing and being killed, at least as much as it is around the lowering of 
mortality rates or increasing gross domestic product. The federal government 
spends about as much on violent destruction as it does on health care. Surely it 
has been a good deal easier to appropriate funds for the war in Iraq than it has 
been to extend health care to everyone. This is so even though everyone knows 
that we could have saved more lives by investing in health care the money that 
we instead spent in Iraq. 
So what are we doing? Are we making “mistakes” or are we doing 
something else? If acts of violence are not merely the result of a failure of 
reason, Holmes may be applying the wrong measure. Liberal theory tells us that 
the state’s interest is in advancing individual well-being—as if this end is the 
only common denominator upon which all can agree. If one takes this point of 
view, then one inevitably ends up arguing that the state often acts against its 
own end.12 
I approach politics as a set of practices sustained by beliefs. To use a term 
coined by Clifford Geertz, the state is a “web” of meanings.13 Its primary end is 
to sustain the world that those meanings constitute.14 The political is not an 
exercise in means-ends rationality, serving some extra-political end. Rather, it 
is a structure of the imagination that makes sense of experience by embedding 
it in narratives. To trace the web of meanings is to construct a narrative, 
 
10. The elimination of pain—and the violence that causes pain—can be seen as the 
common end of diverse modern practices including medicine, science, punishment, and politics. I 
owe this point to Samuel Moyn. 
11. See Paul W. Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place 228-91 (2005) (arguing that 
the political meaning of the state cannot be reduced to a means to some non-political end, 
including the aggregate of individual well-being). 
12. Of course, there may be—and indeed are—good normative reasons for pursuing these 
interests in one’s own political practices. Again, my point is philosophical, not political. 
13. See Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, 
in The Interpretation of Cultures 5 (1973). 
14. Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place, supra note 11, at 276-79 (explaining the 
final cause of the state to be only its continuation as a historical presence). 
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because meanings only exist in relationship to each other and to the whole. 
There are multiple narratives of American political experience, most of which 
are so common as to appear banal—for example, notions of the American 
dream, self-evident truths, the rule of law, or “we the people.” There is no 
internal norm or external constraint that requires all of these narratives to 
cohere in a logical order. There are, in fact, serious tensions among them. 
Indeed, what is perhaps most interesting about our political narratives, and 
least acknowledged by liberal political theory, is how they embrace both well-
being and destruction. Which is a better icon of the meaning of the United 
States as a political community: our struggling health care system or a nuclear 
bomb? Which is our dominant political narrative: the rise of the welfare state or 
the performance of individual sacrifice? 
From within the political order, we will, of course, pursue our own 
individual ends. That is, we will deploy means-end rationality for our own 
purposes. But this partial, internal perspective does not offer us an adequate 
view of the whole. We will similarly try to use science or religion as an 
instrument to achieve our particular ends, but that does not tell us what science 
or religion is. For example, although I might pray for divine intervention in 
pursuit of my ends, religion is not simply a means to my ends. This remains 
true even if we consider the aggregate of everyone’s personal ends. The state, 
like religion or any other cultural formation, is not trying to be anything other 
than itself. 
Of course, political practices and beliefs express norms, and a cultural 
practice, including the state, may invite individuals to pursue reform of 
particular practices through the application of these norms. The rule of law in 
particular includes the reform of law as an element of its practice.15 But we 
should not think that the pursuit of reform places us in some neutral space 
outside of the cultural formation. Holmes is pursuing reform of our professional 
practices from within. This is a practice familiar to lawyers, but it is not a 
philosophical contribution. 
A philosophical inquiry only begins when we suspend belief in our 
political norms, at least for the time of the inquiry. This creates the free space 
of thought; it is not a space of practice. When we bracket our beliefs for the 
sake of philosophy, we find they are more complex than those articulated 
through our ordinary political theorizing. Indeed, there are practices and beliefs 
that political theory may fear to voice. In particular, modern political theory 
would rather speak of “mistakes” than acknowledge the place of violence in our 
politics.16 Philosophy, on the other hand, cannot discount violence as merely a 
 
15. See Kahn, Cultural Study, supra note 4, at 7-18 (describing central place of reform 
in the legal imagination). 
16. The bracketing of normative commitment is essential. The point is not to celebrate 
violence, as fascist political theory did, but to understand how violence generates political 
meanings. 
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failure of law, but must take up the question of how violence creates political 
meaning.17 
Too often, we succumb to a temptation to think that the violence of the 
state is merely aberrational or a burden imposed upon us by others—as if we 
really want to be something other than what we are. In a law school, we think 
that all state behavior should be measured by law, and that the object of law is 
security, not violence. But why do we think that? Are we confusing the state—
the actual, not the theoretical state—with the hospital, which should indeed 
operate along the single normative metric of lives saved? The problem for the 
state is not simply to reduce violence, but to sustain two forms of meaning: one 
realized through law and the other through violence. The United States has 
been in a virtually continuous state of war for the past one hundred years. The 
reason is not that we just happen to have enemies. Rather, it is because we are 
prepared to see a world in which our national existence calls forth the 
sacrificial act. Violence against the enemy is only the inverse side of citizen 
sacrifice. In the United States, the phenomenon of sacrifice remains at the very 
heart of political meaning.18 After 9/11, we chose war over law not because we 
judged it more efficient, but because we imagined a world populated by 
enemies, not criminals.19 Other states responded differently, not because they 
had different information—and not because they were more rational—but 
because they imagined the world differently. 
In short, the state may not be pursuing the ends that Holmes assumes it to 
be pursuing. The economy of violence, of killing and being killed, may be one 
of waste and inefficiency from the perspective of our normal economy.20 Our 
ends may be mythical, not practical, as Holmes himself has recognized.21 
Speaking of national security may be just a polite way of speaking of the 
realization of meaning through the performance of violence. It may be the 
performance itself—not some goal outside of the violence—that is of most 
significance to us. 
Connected to this misperception of the character and sources of political 
meaning is a set of assumptions about psychological motivation with which I 
also disagree. Generally, critiques of the administration veer between 
explanations that rely on a psychology of pathology and those that rely on one 
of self-interest: Rumsfeld was pathological, Cheney self-interested. Most 
 
17. For a recent popular exploration of this theme, see Chris Hedges, War is a Force 
that Gives Us Meaning (2002). For a philosophical inquiry, see Paul W. Kahn, Sacred 
Violence: Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty (2008) [hereinafter Kahn, Sacred Violence]. 
18. See Kahn, Sacred Violence, supra note 17, at 107-19. 
19. In distinguishing criminals from enemies, I mean to be invoking Schmitt’s friend-
enemy distinction. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 26 (George Schwab 
trans., expanded ed. 2007). 
20. See Georges Bataille, The Accused Share: An Essay on General Economy 19-
27 (Robert Hurley trans., 1991). 
21. See Holmes, supra note 3. 
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analyses take the second route, self-interest: the administration’s actions are 
explained by concerns about oil, or Halliburton, or the electoral strategy of the 
right. The behavior, it turns out, is rational, but not public-spirited. 
“In Case of Emergency” is more interesting than most partisan critiques 
because Holmes generally prefers the first route: the explanation lies in 
psychological deficiencies that arise from the circumstances of decision.22 For 
the most part, Holmes identifies the failures of the administration’s policies as 
failures of rationality. Decision-makers under stress will fall prey to predictable 
temptations: for example, they do not want their mistakes exposed, they will 
panic and feel a compulsion to do something, they do not want to hear bad 
news, or they will simply fail to take the longer view into account.23 These are 
predictable failures; they are exactly the sort of thing that a well-designed 
national security policy should address. Bruce Ackerman too has proposed a 
legal framework to respond to this problem of decision-making under stress.24 
Law is intended to make up for the deficiencies of natural man. Unless we plan 
early—that is, pass reasonable laws—ordinary psychological vices will likely 
keep us from acting rationally. 
Holmes’s account of psychological pathology blends easily into a partisan 
political narrative. Those in power failed, we are to believe, because they were 
not pure of heart. In America, to be pure of heart is to listen to the voice of 
reason, for our politics is surely to be understood as an Enlightenment project. 
We fight our partisan battles through the rhetoric of public interest. The 
positions we oppose are always held by “special interests” or, to use the 
classical term, “factions.” The party in power has failed to rise above personal 
circumstance; we, in the opposition, promise to reconstruct policy on the basis 
of reason alone. Accordingly, Holmes offers a platform of reasonable reform. 
Because he speaks in the language of reason, he can claim to speak for the 
common good. 
Holmes pursues this ideal of a politics of reason down the predictable 
lines of American centrism. Reason will cure psychological temptation, 
whether grounded in individual failure of character or partisan ambition. The 
form of that cure will be procedural, and procedure is embodied in the 
institutions of legality. Not war, but law. More separation of powers on the one 
hand, and more due process, on the other. This is procedure writ large and 
small.25 The failure to comply with law can have no value in and of itself. It is 
“unreasonable,” and it goes without saying that an unreasonable practice has 
 
22. See Holmes, In Case of Emergency, supra note 1, at 307-08. 
23. Id. at 324. Here, Holmes shows the influence on his thought of the behavioral 
economics trend of analysis that is popular in much contemporary legal analysis. See Behavioral 
Law and Economics (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000). 
24. See Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in 
an Age of Terrorism (2006). 
25. For an earlier model of this form of reasoning, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980). 
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little chance of success. This deep belief in the intersection of reason and law is 
supported, in the American case, not just with the appeal to theory, but also by 
citing the founding fathers,26 who represent that miraculous moment at which 
reason and will were one.27 
All of this is an admirable demonstration of conviction on the part of 
Holmes: the conviction that the ends of the political community are to advance 
individual well-being, to secure a just order between individuals and the state, 
and to advance justice among states. Here, I choose my words carefully: this is 
all a matter of faith. The term we often use for this faith is “the rule of law.”28 I 
am not at all sure, however, that, standing alone, this describes the political 
faith of the American citizenry. I am quite sure that it fails as an adequate 
description of our political practices and beliefs. 
Once the state takes up the practice of killing and being killed, reason is 
not much of a guide to action, and law is not the boundary of political meaning. 
If the state performs its meaning through acts of sacrificial violence, it should 
not surprise us that it continues to fall into the pattern of “mistakes” that 
Holmes identifies. What seems irrational and counterproductive may be 
working in a different register of meaning. Politics in this broad sense is not a 
technical enterprise; it is not like a hospital. It is more like love: its end is to 
bring forth and sustain meaning in the world, and it is not necessarily moved by 
the claims of reason. To act counter to reason—that is, beyond the boundaries 
of reason—can be a measure of love.29 
If the state is not trying to be reasonable in its pursuit of death over life, 
then we can understand why preaching reasonable reform rarely has much 
effect on state practices. The sources of meaning at stake do not hold 
themselves accountable to reason. Affirming a lack of such accountability may 
be perfectly irrational but nevertheless wholly meaningful. This is the starting 
point of religious faith for many: one does not test faith by reason. Setting 
ourselves the task of theoretical understanding, we may miss the phenomenon 
of political belief. People do not reason themselves to faith, whether in God or 
nation. They find themselves already entangled in a web of meanings. This 
does not mean that they cannot subject those beliefs and practices to the 
scrutiny of reason. To argue that they should—or even that they do—is to make 
a political claim. It is to take a stand within the practice. 
 
26. See Holmes, supra note 3. 
27. See Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 
Yale L.J. 449, 457-62 (1989). 
28. See Paul W. Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the 
Construction of America (1997). 
29. Recall King Lear’s famous plea in response to his daughter’s stern use of reason to 
defeat his demand for care, “O! reason not the need.” See Paul W. Kahn, Law and Love: The 
Trials of King Lear 64-68 (2000). 
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III 
THE ENDS OF THE POLITICAL 
This takes me to the second issue I raised at the start: what are the terms 
of an alternative analysis? I have already been speaking in these terms, but let 
me try briefly to summarize my perspective.30 No less than an institution for 
individual welfare, the modern state—even the liberal state—has been a hugely 
successful enterprise of sacrifice. Of course, the liberal state does protect life, 
property, and well-being. Consider this the moment of law. But, in a crisis, this 
same state takes life, destroys property, and causes massive injury. Consider 
this the moment of sacrifice. The state reserves the right to claim every life and 
to consume all material wealth—public and private. This is exactly the meaning 
of the total wars of the twentieth century—wars that systematically ignored the 
distinction of combatants from non-combatants.31 The distinction failed again 
in the wars of decolonization, and was completely abandoned in the Cold War 
threats of mutual assured destruction. Unsurprisingly, it is failing once more in 
the war on terror. 
Popular sovereignty expresses itself one way in the rule of law: 
democratic procedures of law-making are intended to ground the legitimacy of 
positive law. Popular sovereignty expresses itself another way in the 
democratization of sacrifice. The modern democratic state did not just extend 
the franchise universally, it extended the imaginative possibility of sacrifice. To 
sacrifice is to give up the finite self for the realization of the sacred. This is the 
core of the Christian idea of martyrdom. Our high rhetoric of the “ultimate 
sacrifice” appeals directly to ideas of consecration—for example, “hallowed 
ground”—and to resurrection—“through death the nation might live.” The 
tradeoff that Holmes speaks of rests less on claims of efficiently meeting 
threats than on the deepest aspect of Western religious faith: only through death 
comes life. 
The modern social imaginary holds together beliefs in law and in sacrifice 
that are in substantial tension.32 For example, these beliefs point in quite 
different directions when considering political origins: one looks to a social 
contract, the other to a pledge of life. They describe quite different narratives of 
national history: one speaks of the progressive development of law to secure 
individual well-being; the other speaks of a continuous line of violence from 
Revolution, to Civil War, to the great wars of the twentieth century, to the war 
on terror. This double character of the national narratives regularly breaks out: 
for example, revolution and constitution, war and law, sacrifice and well-being. 
 
30. For a systematic analysis see Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place, supra note 11. 
31. On the nineteenth-century origins of total war see David A. Bell, The First Total 
War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (2007). 
32. On the idea of the social imaginary as a descriptive category, see Charles Taylor, 
Modern Social Imaginaries (2004) (describing the social imaginary not as a set of ideas, but 
rather as that which enables the practices of a society by making sense of those practices). 
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In times of such conflicts, we often become quite confused. The move from one 
narrative to the other can be as abrupt as a declaration of war. 
That we are drawn to both law and sacrifice is no surprise. Neither 
perspective can fully subordinate the other; neither perspective can even make 
sense of the other. This is a tension that must be managed rather than 
resolved.33 Its management is a way of living, not a set of arguments. The high 
form of our political rhetoric always appeals to sacrifice as that act in which the 
truth of the individual and the truth of the state realize a kind of unity of 
ultimate meaning. We are all called upon to overcome our individual interests 
for the sake of realizing the truth of the nation, a truth that is beyond words in 
the same way that the sacred is beyond words. But moments of such rhetoric 
and such sacrifice always are just that: moments. They are the political 
equivalent of the ecstatic, after which we fall back into our ordinary pursuits, 
secure in a world of law. Americans are not interested in permanent revolution, 
but neither do they think that law can endure without a readiness to engage in 
sacrificial violence. 
State violence necessarily appears from the legal point of view as self-
defense.34 It must, since the end of law is individual well-being. But we have 
no reason to accept this as the only point of view. From the point of view of 
sacrificial violence, law appears as a set of limits quite incommensurable with 
the meanings at stake in political life. There is no point within the law at which 
an individual is required to sacrifice himself, although he may have to expose 
himself to risk.35 Sacrifice is a way of making sacred, and that is always beyond 
the legal imagination. Sacrificial violence is the expression of sovereign 
existence in and through the body of the citizen. This needs no further 
justification, as if it is a means to some other end. Of course, it can be thought 
of as the defense of the legal order, but it can just as easily be thought of as the 
foundation or source of all political meaning. 
All of this is quite familiar in the deeper history of the Western 
imagination: do we practice a faith of law, or of sacrifice that puts an end to 
law? Judaism put law at the center of its beliefs and practices, while Saint Paul 
proclaimed “Christ is the end of the law.”36 To believe in the redemptive power 
of Christ’s sacrifice is to be beyond the ordinary concerns of well-being under 
law. We carry forward both narratives in our political community. We need to 
understand our political culture as maintaining a commitment to both individual 
welfare through law and to sovereignty through sacrifice. We should resist 
claims of priority: each sees the whole from its own point of view. Each can 
displace the other, but is subject to displacement in turn. There is nothing new 
 
33. On the technique of management, see Kahn, Sacred Violence, supra note 17, ch. 5. 
34. Symbolically, the Department of War became the Defense Department in 1947, just at 
the time that the threat of weapons of mass destruction extended to the entire population. 
35. See Kahn, Sacred Violence, supra note 17, at 94. 
36. Romans 10.4 (Revised Standard Version). 
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in this: it may be the oldest problem of the Christian Church, which had to span 
admiration for the sacrificial practices of those enthralled with Christ, on the 
one hand, and a concern for individual well-being in the ordinary domestic 
settings of family and work, on the other.37 What did it mean to be a good 
Christian: to become priest and practice celibacy, or to participate in the 
sacrament of marriage and raise a family within the church? In our political 
faith, we have become more democratic: the double character of living and 
dying—of well-being and sacrifice—attaches directly to each of us. In an age 
of weapons of mass destruction, just as in the prior age of total war, everyone is 
subject to both sources of meaning. Today, the transition from one to the other 
can be as quick as finding oneself in the wrong building or on the wrong 
airplane on a September morning. 
What we find when we trace the web of meanings constitutive of the 
political imagination is not theoretical coherence in support of individual well-
being. We find no priority given to reason; we do not even find a commitment 
to the principle of non-contradiction. We find that waste can be as meaningful 
as efficiency, that violence can be more important than security, that acting 
outside of the law can be as much a source of meaning as staying within law, 
and that humiliation competes with dignity as a norm of political behavior. We 
find, if we are honest, that we have the same capacities for killing, injuring, and 
humiliating that we see in the enemy. 
Forget, for the moment, the aspiration for individual accountability under 
legal norms. Think instead of the actual practices of Western politics over the 
last two centuries. Over and over, political identity has been a ground of life or 
death: one died because one was German, French, or American. One killed for 
the same reason. For the most part, those who killed and those who died were 
both morally innocent. As individuals, neither had offended the other. In the 
American Civil War, relatives and friends found themselves engaged in 
political acts of killing and being killed. They killed and died even as they 
remained friends. 
CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHY AND 9/11 
The practices of killing and being killed for the state must be explained. 
They should be at the center of any philosophical account of our political 
experience. This is just the imaginative construction within which the 9/11 
attack was framed. It was an attack on our national existence, not because the 
nationhood was actually threatened, but because individuals died as citizens. 
Such a death is read as a sacrifice. That reading is quite independent of “the 
facts of the matter,” ignoring, for example, that many noncitizens died as well. 
This is the imaginative construction under which the nation goes to war. Not 
 
37. For a contemporary treatment of the Christian phenomenon of sacrifice, see Elizabeth 
A. Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture Making (2004). 
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because war is a more efficient response than law enforcement, but because 
archetypes of political meaning have been triggered. 
War is a practice of reciprocal sacrifice. It moves forward in the political-
psychological dimension of humiliation, for nothing is more humiliating for a 
nation than defeat. The blow struck on September eleventh worked in this 
dimension, and so has the response. To think that the destruction of war is 
compatible with individual dignity is to confuse warfare with dueling. Those 
days are over, if they ever existed. Modern warfare is about the anonymity of 
destruction, not about mutual respect. On the battlefield, we are as far away as 
possible from the idea of dignity that informs the rule of law. Of course, there 
is the law of war, but this is a code of death and destruction, specifying who 
can be killed and at what costs to others. We may have good reasons to support 
adherence to humanitarian law, but we should not confuse that law with the 
ends of dignity and equal recognition that ground the domestic order of law. 
The response to an enemy willing to engage in his own acts of sacrifice is 
to humiliate, for humiliation is intended to break the sacrificial practices of the 
other. Mere violence is not a threat to the martyr; rather, it is an opportunity to 
realize meaning. One wins in a sacrificial conflict only by moving the enemy 
from an experience of martyrdom to one of humiliation. A nation or people that 
experiences violence only as martyrdom and not as humiliation cannot be 
defeated, even if victory will take decades. This was the lesson the West should 
have learned from the wars of decolonization. 
The experience of the failure of sacrifice is exactly the experience of 
humiliation. It is to admit defeat, to confess that one no longer believes. The 
practice of humiliation is the practice of torture, whether it meets the legal 
standard or not. No one should ever be surprised that the practice of state 
violence leads to torture. This is simply another way of saying that we are no 
longer in the world imagined by law. We are following other forms of meaning. 
Today, we find ourselves pursuing a practice of humiliation because we are 
deep within the imaginative configuration of political violence. These are 
things that law cannot bear to see. When forced to look, it will necessarily 
condemn. But we should not take that condemnation at face value. There are 
reasons that few violators of humanitarian law are ever prosecuted, and that 
when we look closely at the war hero, he often turns out to be indistinguishable 
from the war criminal. 
None of what I have said is spoken from a normative point of view. I have 
not tried to convince anyone to take up the burden of sacrifice or to be satisfied 
with the limits of law. One is not bound to the social imaginary as one is bound 
to nature. We can choose law over war; we can seek to reform our practices and 
beliefs. We can think them wrong from a moral point of view. What we should 
not think, however, is that our political practices are trying to be something 
other than what they are. We need to look clearly and speak the truth as well as 
we can, if we are to understand what is done in our name by the state. Those 
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not listening to the good advice offered in Stephen Holmes’s excellent essay 
are hearing other music, under which their actions cannot be considered 
mistakes. Instead, they are performing the primitive rituals of violence as they 
make themselves known in our post-modern times. 
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